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Still together, but apart? Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas
Tadeusz Iwański
The peace deal agreed on 5 September 2014 concerning the ceasefire in the region covered by 
the conflict in the Donbas brought about a significant reduction in the scale of military clashes. 
However, in mid-January the separatist forces, supported by the Russian military, started an 
offensive along the entire front line. For example, they seized the airport in Donetsk and the 
village of Krasnyi Partyzan. About a third of the Donetsk and the Lugansk oblasts currently re-
main outside Kyiv’s control (see Map). Before the war, these areas were inhabited by 6.6 million 
residents, 15% of Ukraine’s total population. The process launched in September 2014 in Minsk, 
which was intended to regulate the conflict within the so-called trilateral contact group (Ukra-
ine, Russia, the OSCE and representatives of the separatists), resulted in an exchange of some 
prisoners of war, although it failed to have any political effects. Attempts at regulating the 
political situation were additionally complicated by the illegal ‘elections’ of leaders of the two 
separatist regions, the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (the DPR and LPR).
In connection with the situation in the Donbas, in November 2014 the Ukrainian government 
launched a series of actions to adapt the country to the de facto loss of control over part of the 
Donbas. These actions included withholding payments of social benefits for local residents, 
and of government subsidies for state institutions whose functioning had been suspended 
on the territories outside Kyiv’s control. In December 2014 and January 2015 decisions were 
taken to partly restrict passenger traffic in these areas.
The above-mentioned measures launched by Kyiv are intended to minimise budgetary spen-
ding and prevent the spread of the conflict beyond the area covered by anti-terrorist opera-
tions. It is evident that Kyiv is not hoping to regain the occupied territories in the immediate 
future, and is trying to maintain a status quo in the region, considering this as one of the best 
options currently available. The Ukrainian government initiatives have been poorly coordina-
ted and extremely uncomfortable for the residents who have remained on the territory of 
the so-called DPR and LPR. Combined with the monopoly on information held by Russia and 
the separatists, these measures have aggravated the Ukrainian government’s negative image 
among the region’s residents. 
Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas, launched in response to Russia’s aggression, has served as 
a warning for neighbouring oblasts and has limited the separatist tendencies there. Paradoxi-
cally, it has also enabled the current government to justify the slow pace of reforms, and also 
to keep the armed voluntary battalions, which are perceived as a potential threat to the sta-
te’s internal stability, far away from the capital city. At the same time, however, Kyiv’s actions 
have boosted the sense of rejection among residents of the separatist-controlled areas, which 
further complicates the chances for their future social integration with the rest of Ukraine.
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Kyiv’s actions towards the part of the 
Donbas remaining beyond its control…
In Minsk on 5 and 19 September 2014, repre-
sentatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and the 
separatists signed a protocol and a memoran-
dum respectively. These documents provided 
for the introduction of a ceasefire; the release of 
both sides’ prisoners of war and hostages; the 
withdrawal of armed separatist troops, merce-
naries and military equipment from the territory 
of Ukraine; the establishment of a 30-kilometre 
buffer zone to separate the warring sides, and 
other measures1. In the political sphere, the doc-
uments included provisions for organising early 
local elections on the separatist-controlled ter-
ritories in December 2014, in accordance with 
Ukrainian laws, and for granting these territories 
separate rights in the fields of the economy and 
culture. These rights were defined in the special 
act for Donbas adopted by parliament in Kyiv on 
16 September 20142. The ceasefire led to the sep-
aratist troops supported by Russian military units 
suspending their offensive, and decreased inten-
sity of military operations. The separatists criti-
cised the provisions of the new act as insufficient, 
and held their own elections on 2 November3.
Facing the effective failure of the Minsk agree-
1 Rafał Sadowski, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, ‘The 
ceasefire in eastern Ukraine’, OSW Analyses, 10 Septem-
ber 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2014-09-10/ceasefire-eastern-ukraine
2 Tadeusz Iwański, ‘Ukraine’s parliament passes a special act 
for Donbas’, OSW Analyses, 17 September 2014, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-09-17/
ukraines-parliament-passes-a-special-act-donbas
3 Tadeusz A. Olszański, ‘Illegal elections in Donbas’, OSW 
Analyses, 5 November 2014.
ments, Kyiv introduced regulations to adapt 
the state to the new situation. On 4 November 
the National Security and Defence Council of 
Ukraine (NSDC) passed a decision (enacted by 
a presidential decree of 14 November) to sus-
pend the functioning of state institutions and 
enterprises operating on the territories outside 
Kyiv’s control, relocate their assets and docu-
ments and evacuate the employees. A recom-
mendation was formulated for the National 
Bank of Ukraine (NBU) to oblige commercial 
banks to suspend their operations on these 
territories and to stop maintaining current ac-
counts owned by businesses and individual 
customers. Additionally, a resolution by the 
Ukrainian government of 7 November4 sus-
pended the payment of grants and subsidies 
for the coal-mining industry. It also provided 
for the  withholding of financial transfers for 
the state budget sector and payments of social 
security benefits to those individuals who did 
not register as displaced persons on the terri-
tories controlled by the central government 
by 1 December (at the end of December, the 
deadline was moved back to 1 February 2015). 
According to the document, those individuals 
who failed to register would receive the out-
standing benefits when these territories are 
brought back under Kyiv’s control.
As a consequence, in late November 2014 the 
central bank demanded that the commercial 
banks suspend their financial operations in the 
parts of the Donbas outside Kyiv’s control. The 
banks were requested to stop maintaining cur-
rent accounts owned by legal and natural per-
sons, to disconnect their ATMs, and to block all 
credit and debit card transactions. The decision 
accelerated the process of closing bank outlets 
in the region and suspended all cash-free trans-
actions. On 21 November, the state-owned Os-
hchadbank decided to relocate its Donetsk and 
4 Постанова від 7 листопада 2014, № 595, Деякі питання 
фінансування бюджетних установ, здійснення 
соціальних виплат на селеннютанадання фінансової 
підтримки окремим підприємствам і організаціям 
Донецької та Луганської областей
Facing the effective failure of the Minsk 
agreements Kyiv suspended the function-
ing of state institutions and payments of 
social security benefits on the territories 
outside Kyiv’s control.
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Lugansk branches to Kramatorsk and Severodo-
netsk (towns controlled by government forces) 
respectively. On 27 November Raiffeisen Bank 
Aval withdrew from the region. Other banks, 
including the largest privately-owned bank Pri-
vatBank, had closed their outlets before that 
date. Previously, universities, hospitals and oth-
er health care centres had been partly relocat-
ed onto Kyiv-controlled territories (to Krasnyi 
Liman in the Donetsk oblast and to Rubizhne 
and Severodonetsk in the Lugansk oblast). On 
27 November Ukrainian Post announced that it 
would suspend its operations, and a day later 
the Ministry of Energy issued a regulation obli-
gating 252 companies controlled by the minis-
try to suspend their activities.
…and the consequences thereof 
Explaining the grounds for the decision to 
freeze the payments of social benefits Prime 
Minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk emphasised the 
lack of consent to “finance Russian terrorism”, 
while the presidential administration empha-
sised the attacks on vehicles used to transport 
cash, and the seizing of the NBU’s branch office 
in Donetsk. The central government’s actions 
towards the Donbas have  called forth a wide 
range of opinions. Politicians from the ruling 
coalition, the pro-Western media and experts 
jointly agreed that the decision was difficult, yet 
necessary. Opposition politicians5, on the other 
hand, have criticised the government’s actions. 
Criticism has also been voiced by the media re-
lated to opposition circles, including the daily 
Segodnya6 owned by the oligarch Rinat Akhme-
tov, a Donbas native. Similar reactions to Kyiv’s 
actions were expressed by the separatists, who 
accused the government of imposing an “eco-
nomic blockade on the Donbas”.
5 For example Nestor Shufrych in Інна Ведернікова, 
Міжфедералізацією та блокадою, Дзеркало Тижня, 21 
November 2014 (which also includes positive opinions).
6 See for example Ігор Ветров, На Донбасі починається 
голодомор: жителі виходять на голодні бунти, 
Сегодня, 25 November 2014.
It seems that the underlying cause of the NS-
DC’s decisions was the government’s intention 
to cut budgetary spending, motivated by the 
catastrophic condition of the Ukrainian econo-
my, and also required by the International Mon-
etary Fund as a condition enabling the payment 
of subsequent loan instalments. According to 
calculations prepared by the government, the 
total sum of grants and subsidies offered to 
the parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts 
outside Kyiv’s control in 2014 amounted to 
19.6 and 14.6 billion hryvnia (around US$1.3 
and 1 billion)7 respectively. By withholding the 
payments, the government tried to offset the 
state’s losses resulting from the absence of the 
tax revenues and customs duties which should 
have been collected in the two oblasts. These 
outstanding payments for the period between 
January and October 2014 have been estimated 
at 6.7 billion hryvnia (around US$450 million)8. 
There are no grounds for supposing that the 
Ukrainian government intended to force Russia 
and the separatists to make political conces-
sions in exchange for revoking the decision, or 
to worsen the situation of local residents in or-
der to fuel their anti-separatist mood. Despite 
the unpaid bills for the supply of gas and elec-
tricity to the occupied territories, Kyiv has not 
so far decided to cut the utilities off. According 
7 Вступне слово Прем’єр-міністра Арсенія Яценюка на 
засіданні Кабінету Міністрів України від 5 листопада 
2014 року
8 However, the types of taxes have not been specified. 
Державний бюджет не доотримав 6,7 млрд гривень 
податків з Донбасу.
The underlying cause of the NSDC’s deci-
sions was the government’s intention to cut 
budgetary spending, motivated by the cat-
astrophic condition of the Ukrainian econ-
omy, and also required by the International 
Monetary Fund as a condition enabling the 
payment of subsequent loan instalments.
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to government representatives, this suggests 
that the state is still willing to take care of its 
citizens. It is likely that this was one of the con-
ditions for Russia signing the contract to con-
tinue supplying coal and electricity to Ukraine9.
The above-mentioned actions carried out by 
Kyiv in the region have resulted in a situation 
which is beneficial for the government in the 
context of the state’s domestic political inter-
ests. Russia’s aggression and the on-going con-
flict in the east of Ukraine can be used as justifi-
cation for the slow pace of reforms and for the 
worsening economic situation. Moreover, they 
enable the government to foster a narration ac-
cording to which any criticism of its actions is 
wrong a priori, as being equivalent to Russian 
propaganda. Additionally, the conflict in the 
east of the country enables the government to 
keep armed voluntary battalions far away from 
the capital city. These units partly have their 
roots in the Euromaidan Self-Defence groups, 
and enjoy a high level of confidence among the 
public10, but their return from the front is seen 
by the government in Kyiv as a threat to the 
country’s social stability. The current situation 
limits the influence of politicians linked to the 
region and to Russia, including representatives 
of the Opposition Bloc, on central-level poli-
tics. It is also weakening the position of these 
groups’ sponsors, in particular Rinat Akhme-
tov. However, the economic aspect seems to 
be of key importance. Maintaining the current 
situation in the east is costly; according to the 
9 http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/01/20/7055629/
10 7 points on a 10-point scale, where 10 stands for full 
confidence. See KMIS survey for Dzerkalo Tyzhnya http://
opros2014.zn.ua/authority
Ukrainian government estimates daily expen-
diture on military actions amounts to approx-
imately US$5.5 million. However, regaining the 
Donbas or regulating the conflict in such a way 
as to bring the region back under Kyiv’s control 
would require investing huge funds in its recon-
struction (according to one estimate presented 
by Arseniy Yatsenyuk in August 2014, a sum of 
around US$8 billion; currently, the amount is 
much higher). Kyiv’s actions towards the Don-
bas in response to Russia’s policy can be re-
ferred to as a ‘freezing strategy’. These moves 
may prove to be risky for the government in the 
context of the current social mood. Military ac-
tions to defend the Donbas are supported by 
over 60% of Ukrainians who are largely disap-
pointed with the lack of progress one year af-
ter the Euromaidan’s victory, and almost half of 
respondents have expressed their readiness to 
take part in protest actions11.
The government’s actions in the securi-
ty and military spheres
According to the memorandum signed on 
19 September 2014 in Minsk, a taskforce com-
posed of Russian and Ukrainian military peo-
ple, assisted by OSCE observers, was expected 
to delineate a so-called demarcation line and 
create a 30-kilometre security zone around it, 
from which the warring sides would withdraw 
their troops and heavy military equipment. The 
taskforce launched its work in late September 
but the line has not been delineated so far, 
and the January offensive suggests that Mos-
cow will not abide by these agreements. At 
the same time, since then Kyiv has launched 
a number of actions on its side of the front line 
(which is expected to form the basis for delin-
eating the demarcation line) to prevent military 
operations spreading into the remaining parts 
of Ukraine. The territories adjacent to this line 
11 KMIS survey http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=re-
ports&id=494&page=1
Kyiv’s actions indicate the government’s in-
tention to isolate the separatist-controlled 
areas, or possibly even to build a specific 
cordon sanitaire in the future.
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have been divided into four sectors, and the 
Ministry of Defence has launched engineer-
ing works to build three lines of 410-kilometre 
defences, composed of a network of fortifica-
tions, trenches and check points. In early No-
vember the first line was completed, the sec-
ond (located approximately 15–20 km west of 
the first line) is 50% complete12. Kyiv’s aim is to 
limit the activity of the separatists who intend 
to ‘align the border’ in order to seize certain 
strategic towns and objects, in the hope that 
these locations could reinforce the region’s in-
dependence in the future (such as the heat and 
power plant in Shchastie, and the transport 
hub in Debaltseve).
On 26 January 2015 Prime Minister Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk announced that a ‘state of emergen-
cy situation”’ would be introduced in the Do-
netsk and Lugansk oblasts, under which rescue 
services and civil defence units would operate 
in an emergency mode. Previously, the govern-
ment in Kyiv had limited the scale of passenger 
traffic between the area covered by military 
operations and the rest of Ukraine. On 3 Janu-
ary 2015 the secretary of the NSDC, Oleksandr 
Turchynov, announced that the Ukrainian side 
had delineated seven road corridors linking the 
separatist-controlled areas with Ukraine, and 
that the border guards and customs service 
posts located along these corridors would per-
form detailed controls of people, goods and ve-
hicles. It was also announced that the remaining 
communication routes might be mined. On 15 
January 2015 the Ukrainian Security Service pub-
lished rules13 for crossing the demarcation line 
(through three cargo points and four passenger 
points), and for obtaining passes without which 
any travel would be forbidden. These rules were 
12 Дмитро Дєнков, Три “шари” захисту від ДНР-ЛНР, 
Українська Правда, 7 November 2014.
13 Information provided by the Ukrainian Security Ser-
vice. Оновлений тимчасовий порядок в’їзду на 
неконтрольовану територію та виїзду з неї громадян 
України та іноземців (осіб без громадянства) від 
22.01.2015 року.
to come into force on 21 January. They are strict 
and observing them can be time-consuming; 
among the documents required are identity 
cards (both the original and a copy), statements 
confirming the purpose of the traveller’s entry/
exit, their travel destination and a detailed travel 
plan. Passes can be obtained in only four cities 
on Kyiv-controlled territory: Mariupol, Debalt-
seve, Starobelsk and Velyka Novosilka.
Kyiv’s actions indicate the government’s inten-
tion to isolate the separatist-controlled areas, 
or possibly even to build a specific cordon sani-
taire in the future. These actions are considered 
to be temporary measures, and were launched 
in response to a growing number of acts of 
sabotage organised in south-eastern Ukraine14. 
They are aimed at containing the conflict with-
in its current borders and limiting the transit 
of weapons and individuals who might pose 
a threat to the state’s law and order tothe re-
maining areas. It is currently impossible to ver-
ify the effectiveness of these actions. What is 
certain, however, is that they are having a neg-
ative impact on the Donbas residents’ percep-
tion of Kyiv’s policies.
The economic consequences for Ukraine
So far Kyiv has not devised any specific principles 
to govern the functioning of business enterpris-
es operating on the separatist-controlled territo-
14 Since the end of December 2014, regular series of ex-
plosions have been heard in Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, 
Kharkiv and Zaporizhye as well as other locations.
Maintaining a status quo in the region 
will most likely contribute to loosening its 
economic ties with the rest of Ukraine and 
poses a threat that certain production cy-
cles in which Donbas-based companies 
are involved will be broken.
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ries15. Announcements made to date suggest that 
trade contracts will be signed only with those 
companies which have re-registered their princi-
pal place of business to areas controlled by Kyiv, 
and funds will be transferred to accounts opened 
with Ukrainian state-owned banks. Such transac-
tions are already being effected, for example in 
the case of steam coal, which is extracted almost 
exclusively on separatist-controlled territories and 
consumed by Ukrainian heat and power plants. 
In January, the deputy minister of energy Yuri 
Zyukov announced that the first supplies would 
arrive by the end of the month, and that the 
suppliers would include companies such as Lu-
ganskvuhilya and Antratsyt16. The current situ-
ation has opened the way to corrupt activities. 
Although a Ministry of Finance statement sug-
gested that VAT refunds can be obtained only by 
those companies which have re-registered their 
business onto Kyiv-controlled territory17 (the num-
ber of such companies is very small), refunds have 
in fact also been offered to those which have not 
done so18. The beneficiaries include Ukrainian oli-
15 The Act on temporary actions during the period of anti-ter-
ror operations, adopted on 2 September, is currently in 
force. http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/T141669.
html The NSDC’s decision has obligated the government to 
specify the rights and obligations of businesses operating in 
the occupied territories; so far, this has not been done. 
16 According to deputy minister they have re-registered to 
Kyiv-controlled territories. See note: http://www.ostro.
org/general/society/news/461634/
17 Information from the Ministry of Finance. 
Підприємцяміззони АТО, які перереєструвалися 
на території підконтрольній українській владі, 
відшкодовуватимуть ПДВ, 20 November 2014.
18 According to the State Register of Natural Persons and 
Legal Persons-Businesses as of mid-January 2015. 
garchs such as Serhiy Taruta and Rinat Akhmetov.
Regardless of the legal actions, the conse-
quences of the loss of part of the Donbas for 
the Ukrainian economy are likely to be enor-
mous. As a result of the Russian aggression 
towards Ukraine, the most industrialised and 
most densely populated areas of the Donetsk 
and Lugansk oblasts (which in fact are made up 
of several industrial conurbations hosting doz-
ens of huge industrial plants) have come under 
the control of the separatists. Before the out-
break of the armed conflict, the Donbas had 
a 16% share in Ukraine’s GDP; approximately 
70,000 companies were registered there; more-
over, the region generated 25% of Ukrainian ex-
ports and 30% of foreign exchange revenues. 
At the same time, the region’s industry, includ-
ing the heavy, mining and chemical industries 
in particular, was rather inefficient and had not 
been modernised for years. Over recent years, 
industrial output in the Donbas had been de-
creasing, which resulted in above-average un-
employment levels and a growing number of 
individuals entitled to obtain concessions and 
old age pensions (in amounts higher than in the 
rest of Ukraine). In 2012 the Lugansk and Do-
netsk oblasts transferred revenues to the state 
budget tax amounting to 8.2 billion hryvnia 
(US$1 billion according to the then exchange 
rate), and received subsidies to the tune of 22.5 
billion hryvnia (around US$4 billion)19. Indica-
tions suggesting the region’s lack of econom-
ic self-sufficiency were also evident in 2013. 
The Donetsk oblast’s income was 16.3 billion 
hryvnia (US$2 billion), while its expenditure was 
41 billion hryvnia (US$5 billion); in the case of 
the Lugansk oblast the respective figures were 
9.4 billion and 21.35 billion hryvnia (US$1.2 and 
2.8 billion). The difference was offset from the 
central budget20. 
19 For more see the report compiled by the Liga.net por-
tal: Что может потерятьУкраина вместе с Донбассом, 
22 April 2014.
20 Ярослав Ковальчук, Державні рішення, Українська 
Правда, 21 November 2014.
It is evident that the government does not 
treat the initiatives targeted at the Don-
bas residents as a priority. The real prior-
ity remains to reduce budgetary spending 
and protect the rest of the country from 
the wave of destabilisation.
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Although the implementation of the NSDC’s 
decision and of government regulation will con-
tribute to a reduction of state spending by at 
least 15 billion hryvnia21 (around US$1 billion), 
the drop in the industrial output caused by the 
war and lower tax revenues have negatively af-
fected Ukraine’s 2015 economic indicators. Ac-
cording to the NBU’s forecasts, recession and 
a drop in GDP of at least -4.3% should be ex-
pected, along with a reduction in the foreign 
trade balance and an increase in the state bud-
get deficit. Maintaining a status quo in the re-
gion will most likely contribute to loosening its 
economic ties with the rest of Ukraine. It also 
poses a threat that certain production cycles in 
which Donbas-based companies are involved 
will be broken, which in turn may have a nega-
tive impact on the functioning of the Ukrainian 
industrial sector. The most prominent of these 
cycles are coal-related, and include (1) extraction 
and enriching of steam coal, the generation of 
electricity in other regions of the country and (2) 
coal extraction, coke production, and the pro-
duction of steel in metallurgical conglomerates 
such as Azovstal, the Ilyuch Iron & Steel Works 
and Zaporizhstal. Ukraine is also likely to lose 
a large portion of its internal market. 
The government’s policy 
towards the residents of the Donbas
The government in Kyiv offers financial assis-
tance and access to social security benefits to 
those residents of the DPR and LPR who decid-
ed to flee these areas. To support those who 
decided to stay, the government organises hu-
manitarian convoys (which are often blocked 
by separatists), provides gas and electricity sup-
plies and introduces tax reliefs. These activities 
seem to be chaotic, and have not been given 
proper publicity; sometimes they also contra-
21 Estimates by the Director of CASE-Ukraine Dmytro Bo-
yarchuk in: Иван Зайцев, Сколько Украина сeкономит 
на финансовой блокаде Донбасса, Liga.net, 18 No-
vember 2014.
dict other regulations, or have only been intro-
duced to legalise the existing situation. It has 
also been evident that the government does 
not treat the initiatives targeted at the Donbas 
residents as a priority. The real priority remains 
to reduce budgetary spending and protect the 
rest of the country from the wave of destabi-
lisation. This means that the actions carried 
out by the government in Kyiv have not been 
sufficient to convince the Donbas residents 
that remaining in Ukraine would be worth it.
The decision to freeze the payments of social 
security benefits has contributed to an aggra-
vation of the humanitarian situation in the re-
gion – it has made it increasingly difficult for 
disabled and old-age pensioners to obtain ba-
sic means for living, especially in winter. On the 
other hand, those who decided to re-register 
were faced with bureaucratic chaos and queues. 
Although the government in Kyiv points to the 
increasingly rebellious mood among the resi-
dents of the separatist-controlled territories (in-
cluding in Yenakiyevo, Chervonopartyzansk and 
Krasnyi Luch, where several so-called hunger 
rebellions have broken out), so far the protests 
have been few and involved groups of no more 
than several hundred people. Their main causes 
included the lack of means of subsistence and 
the unfair distribution of humanitarian aid pro-
vided by Russia22. No slogans demanding the 
region’s return to Ukraine’s jurisdiction were 
22 Piotr Andrusieczko, Donbasowi grozi głód, Gazeta Wy-
borcza, 29 November 2014.
When the conflict is over, any possible ac-
tions aimed at integrating the residents 
of the breakaway regions with the rest of 
Ukraine will be even more  complicated by 
the growing anti-Russian mood within the 
Ukrainian society , running in parallel with 
pro-European and pro-NATO attitudes.
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presented. Although dissatisfaction with the 
separatists’ rule on these territories is growing, 
any hope for an improvement of the current sit-
uation is linked to the possible annexation of 
the region by Russia. Moreover, it seems that 
the hostile mood among the residents of these 
territories has been targeted not only at the 
government in Kyiv, but also at Ukrainian so-
ciety as a whole. This suggests that when the 
conflict is over, any possible actions aimed at 
integrating the residents of the breakaway re-
gions with the rest of Ukraine will be even more 
difficult than before the war. The process is 
likely to be further complicated by the changes 
which have occurred in Ukrainian society over 
the last year, including in particular the grow-
ing anti-Russian mood, running in parallel with 
pro-European and pro-NATO attitudes.
The situation of those Donbas residents who 
fled the region remains difficult. According to 
estimates, as of January the conflict-ridden re-
gion had been abandoned by as many as one 
million people (a sixth of all the residents)23. 
The President of Ukraine signed a law securing 
the rights and freedoms of internally displaced 
persons (passed by the Ukrainian parliament 
on 20 October) as late as 19 November. When 
signing the document Petro Poroshenko ad-
mitted that the law was far from perfect and 
23 Marta Jaroszewicz, Ukraina: Jak rozwiązać problem 
uchodźców?, Analizy OSW, 17 December 2014.
should be amended. For example, the law pro-
vides for granting financial assistance (US$150 
per month per family, US$50 for a person who 
is unable to work, US$25 for a person able to 
work), and facilitated the path to obtaining the 
necessary documents for those individuals who 
have registered on Kyiv-controlled territories. 
The law could serve as an efficient instrument 
to convince the residents of the occupied terri-
tories to support Ukraine and to challenge the 
position of the self-declared separatist leaders; 
however, the ever-present bureaucracy and the 
insignificant amounts of the financial assistance 
have considerably reduced this positive effect. 
The introduction of restrictions on passenger 
traffic between the separatist-controlled ter-
ritories and the rest of Ukraine and of special 
passes for travellers has also had a negative 
impact on Kyiv’s image. This decision seems to 
be contrary to the policy of encouraging local 
residents to relocate to Kyiv-controlled areas. 
The restrictions are very likely to cause a drop in 
passenger traffic, and the obligation to change 
one’s address (as the basis for obtaining the 
right to social security benefits) was not listed 
as a possible purpose for travel. 
Kyiv has not been conducting any information 
policy on the separatist-controlled territories, 
which can only partly be explained by the ban 
on broadcasting and by the fact that Ukrainian 
media are being jammed. The media are domi-
nated by Russian propaganda which unilaterally 
blames Ukraine for shelling residential buildings 
and for civilian losses. This further aggravates 
the negative attitude towards the government 
in Kyiv. It cannot be ruled out that this is why the 
amnesty for those supporters of the breakaway 
republics who had not committed any serious 
crimes brought rather mediocre effects.
Similarly, there are too few examples of positive 
government policy on territories regained from 
the separatists. No separate law to create a spe-
cial administrative regime on these territories 
has been adopted; no legal amendments have 
A public opinion poll conducted in Kram-
atorsk and Slovyansk in December 2014 
stated that 65% of both towns’ residents 
claim that the activities carried out by 
the central government are insufficient; 
over 50% believe that the situation will re-
main unchanged or will become worse in 
the future.
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been made to accelerate the payments of subsi-
dies from the state budget; nor has the Agency 
for the Reconstruction of the Donbas been es-
tablished as planned. Supplies of electricity and 
gas have been resumed and the infrastructure 
has been partially rebuilt; however, the rather 
unimpressive amount of 300 million hryvnia 
(less than US$20 million) which the government 
had promised to grant to these territories24 has 
not been fully paid out. A public opinion poll 
conducted in Kramatorsk and Slovyansk in De-
cember 2014 stated that 65% of both towns’ 
residents claim that the activities carried out by 
the central government are insufficient; over 
50% believe that the situation will remain un-
changed or will become worse in the future; 
and over 70% of the respondents blame the 
current Ukrainian government for the unfavour-
able situation in both towns (with 30% of the 
respondents blaming Russia)25. The creation of 
a new ministry of information, and the decla-
ration by the new minister that its head office 
will be located in Kramatorsk, may promise an 
improvement of Kyiv’s information policy. At 
the same time, the government’s neglect of 
the territories regained may have far-reaching 
consequences in the context of a possible new 
offensive by the combined Russian-separatist 
forces. 
Prospects
The negotiations on ending the Donbas conflict 
have reached a deadlock resulting from im-
mense differences between the concepts which 
the parties involved have for its resolution. The 
government in Kyiv has repeatedly emphasised 
24 See the newswire http://tyzhden.ua/News/123478 At 
the same time, Yatsenyuk suggested that those oli-
garchs who have massive assents in the Donbas should 
take part in the reconstruction of the region. See: Уряд: 
на відновлення Донбасу не вистачить 8 млрд гривень, 
BBC,16 July 2014.
25 A survey conducted by the Kyiv-based Democratic Ini-
tiatives Foundation in November 2014. Общественное 
мнение освобожденных районов - Краматорск, 
Славянск.
that the only possible scenario for a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict is the implementation 
of the Minsk agreements made in September 
2014. These provide for maintaining Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity and the central govern-
ment’s sovereignty in both domestic and for-
eign policy. For the above-stated reasons these 
provisions are unacceptable for Russia which, 
by escalating tensions in the Donbas, is trying 
to force Kyiv and the West to make concessions 
leading to subordinating the whole of Ukraine 
to Moscow (federalisation, special status for 
the Donbas, etc.). Due to Ukraine’s financial and 
military inability to resume military operations 
and regain the Donbas, and to Russia and the 
separatists sabotaging the Minsk peace deals, 
Kyiv has been implementing an indirect sce-
nario which means a de facto ‘freezing’ of the 
Donbas conflict. The aim of this scenario is to 
isolate the Donbas in the field of security to mi-
nimise the region’s destabilising impact on the 
rest of Ukraine, and to reduce spending on the 
functioning of state institutions and the public 
sector. The government has come to think that 
continued financing of the region, with no tax 
revenue contribution from it, could pose the 
threat of Ukraine going bankrupt.
At the same time, this strategy seems risky in 
the context of society’s expectations of the 
government concerning a solution to the Don-
bas conflict. Less than 2% of the public fa-
vour giving the Donbas up; over 60% support 
a continuation of the fighting for the region’s 
liberation, and less than 20% believe that this 
goal can be achieved solely through peaceful 
negotiations. Moreover, Ukrainians are frus-
trated by the lack of change in their country. 
They are growing ever-poorer due to the rapid 
depreciation of the hryvnia (the value of which 
has halved since January 2014) and the growing 
inflation rate (25%). Combined with a high po-
tential to stage protests, a complete ‘freezing’ 
of the conflict could be seen as a betrayal of the 
national interest, and could trigger a new wave 
of protests. 
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In the immediate future Kyiv will be likely to 
continue its actions aimed at adapting the 
Ukrainian state to the new situation. These 
actions might include declaring the separat-
ist-controlled areas as occupied territory26. The 
separatists are likely to continue  their military 
offensives; it should also be expected that the 
number of acts of terror in the rest of Ukraine 
might rise. Also, a further limited military inter-
vention by Russia, undertaken to force Kyiv into 
making concessions, cannot be excluded. Any 
permanent solution to the conflict in the Don-
bas in a short-term perspective is very unlikely. 
It will depend to some extent on the develop-
ment of the economic situation in Russia and 
Ukraine, and on the possible softening of their 
positions should the crisis become aggravated. 
26 A relevant document is reportedly being prepared 
by the government: Галина Калачова, До зони АТО 
застосують кримський сценарій?, Економічна Правда, 
18 November 2014.
At the same time, the separatist ‘rule’, which 
has been maintained in the Donbas for almost 
a year, combined with the strong anti-Ukrainian 
propaganda spread by Russia, have deepened 
both the negative attitudes among the Donbas 
residents towards the government in Kyiv and 
their sense of cultural and regional indepen-
dence. Regardless of the political prospects for 
solving the Donbas conflict, it can be said even 
as early as today that any full integration of the 
residents of the occupied territories with the 
rest of Ukraine in the future will be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible.
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